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I. INTRODUCTION 
Although Jermaine Mobley had never previously been convicted of 
a violent crime, on December 6, 2010, he was labeled a violent “career 
offender” based on his conviction of possession of a weapon in prison.1  
As a result of this label, Mobley’s sentence was increased by an extra ten 
plus months—additional time that he would not have been subject to 
otherwise.2  To determine that Mobley was a career offender, the 
sentencing judge found that his crime of possession of a weapon in 
prison constituted a “crime of violence” under section 4B1.2(a) of the 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.3  Specifically, the judge held that Mobley’s 
crime was a crime of violence under the guidelines’ residual clause, 
which states that an offense is considered a crime of violence if it 
“involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury 
to another.”4  Thus, Mobley fell into the trap that many other defendants 
fall into every year—labeled a career offender and subjected to a harsher 
sentence based on a vague statute that has produced confusing and 
conflicting results. 
After circuit and district courts released a flood of contradictory 
opinions on what standard to apply when analyzing whether a crime is 
considered a crime of violence under the guidelines’ residual clause, the 
1.  United States v. Mobley, 687 F.3d 625, 626 (4th Cir. 2012). 
2.  Id. at 627.
3. Id.
4.  Id. at 628.
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Supreme Court established a two-part test in Begay v. United States.5  
Under the Begay test, first, the court must determine whether the crime 
creates a serious potential risk of physical injury, and then second, 
determine whether the crime typically involves purposeful, violent, and 
aggressive conduct.6  This note analyzes the Fourth Circuit’s decision in 
United States v. Mobley, focusing on how the majority in Mobley 
misapplied the Begay test and came to the incorrect holding, and 
suggests how to remedy residual clause analysis for the crime of 
possession of a weapon in prison. 
Part II gives a background on the career offender provision and 
residual clause analysis, and the current law on whether possession of a 
weapon in prison is considered a crime of violence, which has resulted 
in a circuit split.  Part III gives a statement of the case to this note, 
United States v. Mobley.  Part IV analyzes how the Mobley majority 
misapplied the Begay two-part test and attempts to remedy residual 
clause analysis for the crime of possession of a weapon in prison.  This 
will include Part IV.A, which explains why the Mobley dissent was 
correct in its opinion, Part IV.B, which examines the inherent problems 
in applying the Begay test, and Part IV.C, which proposes a better 
standard to apply when doing residual clause analysis for the crime of 
possession of a weapon in prison. 
II. BACKGROUND
A. The History and Use of the United States Sentencing Guidelines § 
4B1.1-1.2 Career Offender Provision 
In 1987, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines were created by the 
Sentencing Commission and introduced to the federal criminal justice 
system to achieve uniformity in sentencing.7  The main tool that courts 
use in the guidelines is a sentencing grid where there are forty-three 
offense levels on the vertical axis and six criminal history categories on 
5.  Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008).
6.  Id. at 144.
7.  Timothy W. Castor, Escaping a Rigid Analysis: The Shift to a Fact-Based Approach for
Crime of Violence Inquiries Involving Escape Offenses, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 345, 345 (2004).  
In making the guidelines, Congress instructed the Commission to focus on two facts when imposing 
a sentence on a defendant—one, the current offense and characteristics of the defendant, and two, 
the need for punishment.  Neal Eriksen, Criminal Law—The Meaning of Violence: An Interpretive 
Analysis on Whether a Prior Conviction for Carrying a Concealed Weapon Is a “Crime of 
Violence” Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 801, 806 
(2007). 
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the horizontal axis.8  Sentencing ranges vary depending on the criminal 
category and the offense, and courts must sentence defendants 
accordingly.9 
To meet one of the overarching goals of the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines, imposing harsher sentences on repeat offenders, the 
Sentencing Commission included a career offender provision in the 
guidelines.10  The career offender provision is found in section 4B1.1 of 
the guidelines, and states that a convicted defendant is a career offender 
if: 
(1) he was at least 18 years old at the time he committed the instant 
offense; 
(2) the instant offense is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a 
controlled substance offense; and 
(3) the defendant has at least 2 prior felony convictions of either a 
crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.11 
If the career offender provision applies to a particular defendant, the 
sentencing court will place the defendant in criminal history category 
VI, the highest category on the sentencing grid.12  The court then 
determines the offense level on the vertical axis of the grid and 
ascertains the applicable sentencing range.13  Placing the defendant in 
the highest category for criminal history will result in a longer prison 
sentence.14  Section 4B1.2(a) of the guidelines defines a crime of 
violence as any offense “punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year,” and that 
(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of phys-
ical force against the person of another, or 
(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves the use of 
8.  Castor, supra note 7, at 347. See Appendix.
9.  Castor, supra note 7, at 347-48. 
10.  Id. at 348.
11.  United States v. Mobley, 687 F.3d 625, 627 (4th Cir. 2012). 
12.  Castor, supra note 7, at 348.
13.  Id.
14.  Amy Baron-Evans, Jennifer Coffin & Sara Silva, Deconstructing the Career Offender
Guideline, 2 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 39, 47 (2010).  For nearly all defendants sentenced using the 
career offender provision, the statutory maximum time in prison is 20 years or more, and thus, for 
most defendants, the guideline sentencing range is 210-262 months, 262-327 months, or 360 months 
to life.  The commission didn’t look at the average prison time served pre-guidelines as the starting 
point for the career offender guideline because 28 U.S.C. § 944(h) instructed to set the ranges at or 
near the maximum term authorized.  Therefore, career offenders would have much larger increases 
in prison time served as compared to their sentences before the provision was applied. 
4
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explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious po-
tential risk of physical injury to another.15 
Application Note 1, contained in the comments to § 4B1.2, lists crimes, 
in addition to those enumerated in the statute, that are considered crimes 
of violence, such as murder, manslaughter, and possession of several 
weapons including a sawed-off rifle or machine gun.16  The comment 
also lists crimes not considered crimes of violence, which includes 
unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon.17 
1. The Residual Clause Issue
Under section 4B1.2(a), a crime is considered a crime of violence 
for career criminal purposes if it “otherwise involves conduct that 
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”18  Courts 
look to this residual clause found in the last sentence of section 4B1.2(a) 
if the offense does not fall into the enumerated list of crimes in the 
statute or in Note 1 in the comments.  The residual clause causes 
ambiguity and conflict for courts, as it is often difficult to apply the 
crime of violence standard to offenses not enumerated in the 
guidelines.19  Jurisdictions have developed different approaches and 
standards used to analyze whether a crime is a crime of violence under 
the residual clause, leading to conflicting rulings among the circuit 
courts.20  To interpret the meaning of the guidelines’ residual clause, 
courts have turned to a similar provision, the Armed Career Criminal 
Act (“ACCA”).21 
2. The Armed Career Criminal Provision and Its Relation to the
Sentencing Guidelines 
Congress enacted the ACCA in 1984 to protect society by 
incarcerating violent repeat offenders and limiting their access to 
15.  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (1987).
16.  Mobley, 687 F.3d at 629.  The complete list of crimes that are considered crimes of
violence in Application Note 1 are: murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible 
sex offenses, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of credit, burglary of a dwelling, 
possession of a sawed-off shotgun or sawed-off rifle, silencer, bomb, or machine gun.  Id. 
17.  Id.
18.  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 (1987).
19.  Castor, supra note 7, at 349.
20.  Castor, supra note 7, at 349.
21.  Hayley A. Montgomery, Comment, Remedying the Armed Career Criminal Act’s Ailing
Residual Provision, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 715, 718 (2010). 
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firearms.22  The ACCA imposes a mandatory minimum fifteen-year 
prison sentence for felons found guilty of unlawfully possessing a 
firearm and who have been convicted of at least three prior violent 
felonies or serious drug offenses.23  The ACCA defines a “violent 
felony” as “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 
one year” that: (i) has an element the use, attempted use, or threatened 
use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, 
arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves 
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another.24 The ACCA, like the guidelines, has a residual clause 
characterizing a violent felony as a crime that “otherwise involves 
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another.”25 
The guidelines, including the career offender provision, were 
enacted three years after the ACCA was established.26  Because the 
ACCA’s residual clause for what is considered a violent felony is 
essentially identical to the guidelines’ residual clause for what is 
considered a crime of violence, courts have interpreted crime of violence 
and violent felony as interchangeable terms.27  Opinions interpreting the 
ACCA’s violent felony residual clause are regularly used to construe the 
meaning of the guidelines’ residual clause for a crime of violence and 
vice versa.28  Therefore, the Supreme Court’s opinions in regards to the 
ACCA residual clause also apply and have been considered controlling 
for interpretation of the guidelines’ residual clause.29 
B. The Evolution of the ACCA’s Influence on the Sentencing Guidelines’ 
Career Criminal Residual Clause 
The most recent and controlling Supreme Court case on the 
22.  Id. at 716.  The ACCA is justified by studies showing that violent crimes were largely
being committed by a very small percentage of repeat offenders. Id. Congress aimed to curb armed, 
habitual (career) criminals by limiting their access to firearms.  While the original provision 
subjected any convicted felon found guilty of possession of a firearm, who had three previous 
convictions of robbery or burglary, to the mandatory fifteen-year minimum prison sentence, 
Congress revised the statute to include crimes similar to robbery and burglary presenting a risk of 
injury.  Id. at 717. 
23.  Id. at 717.
24.  Id.
25.  Montgomery, supra note 21, at 717. 
26.  Id. at 718.
27.  Id.
28.  Id.
29.  Montgomery, supra note 21, at 718. 
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meaning of the ACCA’s violent felony residual clause is Begay v. 
United States.30  Prior to Begay, to determine whether a crime fell under 
either the ACCA or the guidelines’ residual clauses, courts simply 
looked at whether the crime in itself presented any possibility of risk of 
injury to another.31  However, in 2008, the Supreme Court in Begay 
narrowed the scope of crimes that can fall under the ACCA’s residual 
clause.32  The defendant in Begay was sentenced to the mandatory 
fifteen-year prison sentence because he was found guilty of being a felon 
unlawfully in possession of a firearm, and the sentencing judge 
determined that Begay had at least three prior felony convictions that 
presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.33  Begay 
had a dozen prior DUI convictions, and under New Mexico state law, a 
DUI becomes a felony the fourth and any subsequent times an individual 
is charged with such crime.34  Therefore, the judge determined that 
Begay’s dozens of DUI convictions were violent felonies that involved 
conduct that presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another.35 
In reviewing whether Begay’s prior DUI convictions could fall 
under the ACCA residual clause, the Supreme Court reasoned that while 
the crime of drunk driving is clearly a dangerous crime, it is dissimilar to 
the enumerated crimes in the statute.36  The Court carefully examined 
the language of the statute and determined that the presence of the 
enumerated list of crimes—burglary, arson, extortion, or crimes 
involving the use of explosives—signaled that the statute covered only 
similar crimes, rather than every crime that presents a serious potential 
risk of physical injury to another.37  The Court held that in order to fall 
30.  Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008).
31.  Evans, Coffin, & Silva supra note 14, at 66.  See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 183 Fed.
Appx. 742 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Vahovick, 160 F.3d 395 (7th Cir. 1998); United States 
v. Young, 990 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1993); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990).  Prior to 
Begay, if there was an abstract possibility of risk of injury, courts interpreted that crime to be a 
crime of violence.  Such crimes included tampering with a motor vehicle, burglary of a non-
dwelling, fleeing and eluding, operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent, possession of 
a short-barreled shotgun, oral threatening, car theft, and failing to return to a halfway house.  Evans, 
Coffin & Silva supra note 14, at 66-67. 
32.  Evans, Coffin & Silva, supra note 14, at 66.
33.  Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 140. 
34.  Id.
35.  Id.
36.  Id. at 141.
37.  Id. at 142.  The court explained that if Congress had meant every crime that presents a
serious risk of injury to another to fall under the statute, they would not have included the examples 
(enumerated crimes) at all.  Id.  Furthermore, the court stated that if Congress had meant to include 
all risky crimes, they would not have included the clause, a crime which has an element “the use, 
7
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under the ACCA residual clause, an offense must be roughly similar, in 
kind as well as in degree of risk posed, to the listed crimes in the 
statute.38 
The majority held that a DUI falls outside the scope of the residual 
clause, as it is too dissimilar to the listed crimes.39  In coming to this 
holding, the Court narrowed the test for determining whether a crime 
falls under the ACCA residual clause.  The Court reasoned that the three 
listed crimes of burglary, arson, and extortion all typically involve 
“purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.”40  Therefore, to determine 
if a crime is similar in kind as well as in degree of risk posed to the listed 
crimes, a court should look to how a reasonable person would consider 
the offense as the law states it and then decide whether the offense 
typically involves purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.41  Begay 
created a two-step analysis for interpretation of the ACCA’s residual 
clause definition of a violent felony: the court must determine whether 
the crime 1) creates a serious potential risk of physical injury, and 2) 
involves purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct by considering the 
crime categorically.42 
Although the Supreme Court in Begay attempted to establish a clear 
test for residual clause analysis, application of the second prong has 
proven to be difficult, as courts struggle to apply the standard to crimes 
not enumerated in the statute.43  Begay followed the categorical 
approach, in which courts look at the crime in the abstract instead of 
how the particular defendant committed the crime, however some courts 
resisted and continued to follow past approaches.44  Before Begay, three 
main approaches to analyzing a crime under both the ACCA and 
guidelines’ residual clauses developed among the courts—the 
categorical approach, the intermediate or modified categorical approach, 
and the fact-based approach.45  While the categorical approach remains 
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force” against a person, as a crime that is likely to 
create “a serious potential risk of physical injury” would seem to fall within the scope of that clause. 
Id. 
38.  Id.
39.  Id. at 142.
40.  Id. at 144-45.  The court stated that purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct makes it
more likely that an offender, later possessing a gun, will use that gun to intentionally harm another 
person—this action goes to the core of the statute, which is preventing career criminals from 
possessing a firearm.  Id. at 145. 
41.  Id. at 141.
42.  Montgomery, supra note 21, at 723; United States v. Begay, 553 U.S. 137, 143 (2008).
43.  Id.
44.  Id.
45.  Jennifer Riley, Note, Statutory Rape as a Crime of Violence for Purposes of Sentence
8
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the majority approach after the Begay decision,46 some courts still adhere 
to previously followed standards because of the difficulty in deciding 
whether a crime typically is “violent” or “aggressive.”47 
1. The Categorical Approach
The Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States formally adopted the 
categorical approach, which the majority of courts apply when 
characterizing a crime as a crime of violence or a violent felony.48  The 
Court in Taylor stated that the language of the ACCA statute supports 
the categorical approach as opposed to considering the underlying facts 
of a case, as the statute defines a violent felony as any crime that “has an 
element” of the use or threat of force, not a crime that involves the use or 
threat of force.49  The Court also noted that the majority of appeals 
courts had mandated the categorical approach, looking to the statutory 
definitions of the offenses and not to the particular facts underlying 
those convictions.50  Since Taylor, the Supreme Court has endorsed and 
followed the categorical approach, as the Court reiterated the categorical 
approach followed in Taylor and Begay in the 2009 case Chambers v. 
United States.51  The categorical approach remains the majority 
Enhancement Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines: Proposing a Limited Fact-Based 
Analysis, 34 IND. L. REV. 1507, 1511 (2001). 
46.  See Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009); United States v. Mobley, 687 F.3d
625, 627 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Boyce, 633 F.3d 708, 709 (8th Cir. 2011); United States 
v. Marquez, 626 F.3d 214, 223 (5th Cir. 2010). 
47.  United States v. Perez-Jiminez, 654 F.3d 1136, 1141 (10th Cir. 2011).
48.  Castor, supra note 7, at 350 (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990)).
In Taylor, the defendant pled guilty to being a felon unlawfully in possession of a firearm, and 
because he had four prior felony convictions, including two for second-degree burglary, the 
sentencing court applied the career criminal sentencing enhancement. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 575. 
However, Taylor appealed the application of the career criminal clause, arguing that his burglary 
convictions did not present a risk of physical injury to another.  Id.  The Court rejected the 
defendant’s argument that the court should examine his individual conduct when determining if his 
crime was a crime of violence, as the Court explained that the enhancement provision has always 
embodied a categorical approach to the designation of predicate offenses.  Id. at 602. 
49.  Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600.  The Court was confident that in drafting the statute, Congress 
intended courts to apply a categorical approach, as the legislative history shows that Congress 
generally took a categorical approach to defining offenses, and no member of Congress suggested 
that a particular crime may count towards enhancement or sometimes may not, depending on the 
facts of the case.  Id.  at 601.  The Court concluded that “if Congress had meant to adopt an 
approach that would require the sentencing court to engage in an elaborate fact-finding process 
regarding the defendant’s prior offenses, surely this would have been mentioned somewhere in the 
legislative history.”  Id. at 601. 
50.  Id. at 599.
51.  Douglas J. Bench, What Constitutes a Violent Felony After Begay?, 67 MO. B. J. 208, 209
(2011) (citing Chambers v. United States, 55 U.S. 122 (2009)).  In Chambers, the court stated that 
9
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approach for courts in residual clause analysis, as it is the approach 
followed in Begay.52  However, both before and after the Begay 
decision, some courts found that the categorical approach created unjust 
results, or had difficulty applying the Begay test, and therefore suggested 
different approaches.53 
2. The Intermediate / Modified Categorical Approach
Some courts have explored an intermediate, or modified categorical 
approach, in determining whether a crime falls under the ACCA or 
guidelines residual clause.54  The Eighth Circuit amended the categorical 
approach in Johnson v. United States, adopting a modified categorical 
approach, where the sentencing court could examine the trial record, 
including charging documents, plea agreements, transcripts of plea 
colloquies, findings of fact and conclusions of law from a bench trial, 
and jury instructions in order to determine whether a crime is a crime of 
violence.55  Various pre-Begay opinions mandated this approach because 
courts found it difficult to apply a strict categorical approach when it 
was not clear from the statute whether a certain crime, such as statutory 
rape or escape from a penal institution, involved a risk of physical 
injury.56  Even after Begay, some courts continue to apply the 
courts should only look to the language in the statute to determine whether a crime falls under the 
residual clause, “not [to] the actual conduct of a defendant giving rise to the prior conviction.”  Id. 
52.  Id.
53.  See, e.g., United States v. Perez-Jiminez, 654 F.3d 1136, 1141 (10th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Robles-Rodriguez, 204 Fed. Appx. 504, 506 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Riggans, 254 
F.3d 1200, 1204 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Young, 990 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1993). 
54.  Robles-Rodriguez, 204 Fed. Appx. at 506; Young, 990 F.2d at 471.
55.  Bench, supra note 51, at 209 (citing Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1273 
(2010)).  The Johnson court examined the trial record in order to determine which portion of the 
statute the defendant was convicted of when a statute includes both violent and non-violent conduct.  
Id.  If such a statute exists, the court said they would turn to the modified categorical approach.  Id. 
56.  Susan Fleischmann, Toward a Fact-Based Analysis of Statutory Rape Under the United
States Sentencing Guidelines 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 425 (1998).  The Ninth Circuit in United States 
v. Young first looked to the elements of the crime charged, and if the elements of the crime did not
include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force, the court then examined whether 
the actual charged conduct of the defendant in the information or indictment presented a serious risk 
of physical injury to another.  Young, 990 F.2d at 471.  The court reasoned that while only a 
statutory definition of a crime may be enough in some crimes of violence analyses, in others, where 
perhaps a statute is ambiguous, the court might need to examine the actual conduct of the defendant.  
The court specifically stated that further factual inquiry beyond the information or indictment is 
inappropriate, as “a sentencing court is not free to make a ‘wide ranging inquiry into the specific 
circumstances surrounding a conviction.’”  Id.  The Fifth Circuit also applied the intermediate 
approach in United States v. Robles-Rodriguez, where the court held that when a statute provides 
multiple methods of committing a crime, some of which may not involve the use of force or risk of 
injury, the court may look to the charging papers.  Robles-Rodriguez, 204 Fed. Appx. 504, 506 (5th 
10
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intermediate approach because the circuit courts struggle to analyze 
whether a crime that can be committed in a multitude of ways typically 
involves purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.57  Courts that 
continue to apply this intermediate approach explain that it comports 
with the commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines, as the comments 
refer to the conduct “expressly charged,” which seemingly refers to 
information presented in the indictment.58  Some courts however have 
gone beyond examining the conduct of the defendant as set forth in the 
indictment or information and examine any facts surrounding the 
conviction.59 
3. The Conduct-Specific Approach/Fact-Based Approach
Under a conduct-specific or fact-based approach, a court can 
examine any facts relating to a defendant’s conviction; may review the 
entire record of the prior proceeding; and/or hold an evidentiary hearing 
to determine whether the defendant’s conduct which gave rise to the 
conviction involved the use of force or a risk of physical injury to 
another.60  A small minority of courts apply this approach when 
conducting crime of violence analysis, explaining that it leads to fair 
results because it bases the determination on the defendant’s own 
conduct instead of the arbitrary determination of whether a statute 
describes conduct that involves a risk of violence.61  Post-Begay, the 
Tenth Circuit has continued to follow pre-Begay precedent and apply a 
conduct-specific inquiry.62  In justifying a conduct-specific approach, the 
Tenth Circuit states that the concerns related to a sentencing court doing 
an ad hoc mini-trial do not apply when the court is examining the 
conduct of the defendant in the instant offense, as the information will 
be more readily available, avoiding an elaborate fact-finding process.63 
Cir. 2006). 
57.  Montgomery, supra note 21, at 715.  The Eighth Circuit continues to use the intermediate
approach, when, as stated in Robles-Rodriguez, a statute “is divided into ‘several discrete, 
alternative sets of elements that might be shown as different manners of committing the offense,’” 
and some manners of committing the offense do not involve the use of force or risk of injury.  See 
Bench, supra note 51, at 209. 
58.  Castor, supra note 7, at 350.
59.  Riley, supra note 45, at 1512.
60.  Id.
61.  Riley, supra note 45, at 1516.
62.  United States v. Perez-Jiminez, 654 F.3d 1136, 1140 (10th Cir. 2011).  In Perez-Jiminez,
the Tenth Circuit noted that Begay analyzed only a past offense, and because the Tenth Circuit was 
analyzing an instant offense, the court cited back to their pre-Begay cases as authority to apply a 
conduct-specific approach when analyzing an instant offense.  Id. 
63.  Id.
11
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However, the majority of courts have rejected this approach.64  
Courts that apply the categorical approach explain that a conduct-
specific approach would require sentencing courts to engage in a time-
consuming and burdensome fact-finding process.65  These courts also 
point out that applying a conduct-specific approach would allow the 
court to base its determination on facts that have merely been alleged, 
instead of the conduct for which the defendant has been convicted, 
which the amendments to the guidelines emphasize as the primary 
inquiry.66  Furthermore, Begay, the current governing law on residual 
clause analysis, mandates that courts should apply the categorical 
approach.67  Because the Supreme Court rejected the fact-based 
approach in Begay, most courts decline to look to an individual 
defendant’s conduct on a specific occasion when doing residual clause 
analysis. 
C. The Current Law on Whether Possession of a Weapon in Prison Is a 
Crime of Violence 
Although the Supreme Court in Begay intended to create a clear test 
for residual clause analysis, circuits remain split on whether certain 
crimes qualify as a crime of violence under the guidelines’ residual 
clause.68  One such crime is possession of a weapon in prison.69  While 
the circuit courts agree that the crime does in fact present a serious risk 
of physical injury, there is disagreement on whether the second prong of 
Begay is met—whether the crime is similar in kind, as well as in degree 
of risk posed, to burglary, arson, extortion, or crimes involving 
explosives, and therefore typically involves purposeful, violent, and 
aggressive conduct.70 
1. Majority Ruling
The Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits currently adopt the majority 
position that the offense of possession of a weapon in prison constitutes 
64.  Montgomery, supra note 21, at 720. 
65.  Castor, supra note 7, at 351.
66.  Id.
67.  Montgomery, supra note 21, at 723. 
68.  Id. at 715.
69.  See United States v. Boyce, 633 F.3d 708, 709 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Perez-
Jiminez, 654 F.3d 1136, 1141 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Marquez, 626 F.3d 214, 223 (5th 
Cir. 2010); United States v. Polk, 577 F.3d 515, 517 (3d Cir. 2009). 
70.  See Boyce, 633 F.3d at 709; Perez-Jiminez, 654 F.3d at 1141; Marquez, 626 F.3d at 223;
Polk, 577 F.3d at 517. 
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a crime of violence under the guidelines’ residual clause.71  Using Begay 
to guide its analysis, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Marquez held 
that because there is clearly a risk of physical injury when an inmate 
possesses a weapon, and because possession of a weapon in prison is 
similar in kind and degree of the risk posed to the crime of burglary of a 
dwelling, the offense is a crime of violence.72  The court explained that 
possession of a weapon in prison is similar to the crime of burglary of a 
dwelling because the main risk of burglary arises from the possibility of 
a face-to-face confrontation between the burglar and a third party.73  
Similarly, while an inmate may not intend to attack someone, his 
possession of a weapon signals his willingness to use it.74  Therefore, 
like burglary of a dwelling, the main risk of an inmate in possession of a 
weapon is the possibility of a face-to-face confrontation with another 
person.75  The court also stressed that there is no legitimate reason for an 
inmate to possess a deadly weapon—its only purpose is for violence, as 
opposed to a felon being in possession of certain firearms, which could 
be used for recreational purposes.76 
The Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Boyce, also held that a 
defendant’s prior conviction of possession of a weapon in prison 
constituted a crime of violence under the guidelines’ residual clause.77  
In regards to Begay’s first prong, the court concluded that possession of 
a weapon in prison presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another because there is no lawful purpose for such possession and 
71.  United States v. Mobley, 687 F.3d 625, 629 (4th Cir. 2012). 
72.  Id. at 630 (citing Marquez, 626 F.3d at 222).  The Fifth Circuit in United States v.
Marquez analyzed whether the defendant’s prior conviction for possession of a weapon in prison, 
specifically a club made of dried magazine paper, was a crime of violence under the residual clause.  
Id. 
73.  Marquez, 626 F.3d at 222. 
74.  Id.
75.  Id.
76.  Id.  The court also relied on their prior ruling in United States v. Hughes, where they held
that a prisoner’s escape from federal custody or confinement was a violent felony under the ACCA 
residual clause. Id. at 228.  In Hughes, the court stated that when a defendant escapes from jail, 
there is a serious potential risk that injury will result when officers find the defendant and attempt to 
place him back in custody; similarly, a prisoner’s possession of a deadly weapon presents the same 
risk that the prisoner’s intentional, purposeful actions will result in injuries to another inmate or 
guard.  Id. at 224 (citing United States v. Hughes, 602 F.3d 669 (5th Cir. 2010)). 
77.  United States v. Boyce, 633 F.3d 708, 709 (8th Cir. 2011).  The weapon in Boyce was
homemade and resembled an ice pick.  Id.  Prison officers discovered the weapon wrapped in a 
bandage on Boyce’s arm.  Id.  The pre-sentence report (“PSR”) did not characterize this conviction 
as a violent felony nor recommend that Boyce be sentenced as an armed career criminal.  Id. at 709-
10. The government objected to the PSR and argued that Boyce’s possession of a weapon in prison 
was a violent felony, and therefore he should receive the ACCA mandatory minimum sentence 
based on his three violent felony convictions.  Id. at 710. 
13
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therefore the possession creates the serious risk of injury to another.78  
The court further held that Begay’s second prong was met because the 
defendant’s possession of the weapon was clearly purposeful, and it was 
also violent and aggressive because “it created the possibility—even 
likelihood—of a future violent confrontation.”79  Using the same 
reasoning set forth in Boyce, the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Perez-
Jiminez also held that possession of a weapon in prison constitutes a 
crime of violence.80  The Tenth Circuit used much of the same analysis 
as the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, stating that there is no legitimate 
purpose for an inmate to possess a deadly weapon in prison, as the 
weapon could only be used to attack another or deter an attack.81  The 
court referred to the ruling in Boyce, stating that they were persuaded 
that the second prong of Begay was met, as the inmate’s possession of 
the weapon indicated his readiness to use violence and enter into a 
conflict.82  While the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have established 
the majority rule that the crime of possession of a weapon in prison 
constitutes a crime of violence under the guidelines residual clause, this 
majority holding departs from an earlier ruling in the Third Circuit.83 
2. Minority Ruling
In United States v. Polk, the Third Circuit held that possession of a 
weapon in prison does not constitute a crime of violence under the 
guidelines residual clause.84  Like the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, 
78.  Id. at 710.
79.  Id. at 712 (quoting United States v. Vincent, 575 F.3d 820, 825 (8th Cir. 2009)) (internal
quotations omitted).  The court turned to their prior ruling in Vincent, where they held that the crime 
of possession of a sawed-off shotgun was a crime of violence.  Id.  The court explained that like the 
crime of possession of a sawed-off shotgun, which is illegal “precisely because it enables violence 
or the threat of violence,” possession of a weapon in prison indicates that the prisoner is “‘prepared 
to use violence if necessary’ and is ready to ‘enter into conflict, which in turn creates a danger for 
those surrounding the armed prisoner.’”  Id.  (quoting United States v. Zuniga, 553 F.3d 1330, 
1335-6 (10th Cir. 2009)). 
80.  United States v. Perez-Jiminez, 654 F.3d 1136, 1138 (10th Cir. 2011).  The weapons the
defendant possessed in Perez-Jiminez were two homemade shanks made from sharpened metal 
knives.  Id. 
81.  Id. at 1143.
82.  Id.
83.  United States v. Polk, 577 F.3d 515, 517 (3d Cir. 2009).
84.  Id. at 517.  In Polk, the court examined whether the defendant’s instant offense of
possession of a weapon, specifically a shank, in prison constituted a crime of violence.  Id.  A 
correctional officer searched Polk’s cell, and found a six-inch plastic homemade shank in an 
envelope containing his personal papers.  Id.  Polk’s total offense level was 14, and when combined 
with his criminal history category of IV (set because the sentencing court determined his offense 
was a crime of violence), his sentencing guidelines range was 37-46 months.  Id.  Without the 
14
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the court explained that Begay governed its analysis; however, the court 
determined that the second prong of Begay, that the offense be similar to 
the enumerated crimes and, therefore, involve purposeful, violent, and 
aggressive conduct, was not met.85  In determining whether the crime 
typically involved purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct, the court 
reasoned that, “the distinction between active and passive crimes is 
vital.”86  While possession of a weapon in prison is purposeful, the court 
stated that it is neither violent nor aggressive, as only the potential exists 
for aggressive or violent conduct, and the act of possession does not, 
without more, involve any aggressive or violent behavior.87  The court 
explained that while possessing a weapon in prison does have inherent 
dangers, “this alone cannot transform a mere possession offense into one 
that is similar to the crimes listed.”88  The court rejected the Tenth 
Circuit’s earlier holding in United States v. Zuniga, saying that “we 
cannot agree with its reasoning that the likelihood or potential for violent 
and aggressive behavior to come about as a result of the offense is 
sufficient for qualifications in light of Begay,” as Begay requires the 
conduct of the crime itself to involve violent and aggressive conduct, not 
just present the risk of violent and aggressive conduct.89 
III. UNITED STATES V. MOBLEY
In December 2010, defendant Jermaine Mobley pled guilty to the 
offense of possession of a prohibited object in prison, violating 18 
U.S.C. § 1791(a)(2).90  While visiting the infirmary because of pain and 
numbness in his feet, a physical therapist discovered an eight-inch shank 
concealed in the insole of Mobley’s shoe.91  Mobley was charged with 
possession of a prohibited object in prison, and the sentencing court 
found that this crime constituted a crime of violence.92  The court was 
enhancement, his range would have been 27-33 months.  Id. 
85.  Polk, 577 F.3d at 519. 
86.  Id.
87.  Id. (citing United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1351 (11th Cir. 2008)).
88.  Id. at 520.
89.  Polk, 577 F.3d at 520; United States v. Zuniga, 553 F.3d 1330 (10th Cir. 2009).
90.  United States v. Mobley, 687 F.3d 625, 626 (4th Cir. 2012). 
91.  Id. at 626.  The prosecutor explained that shanks are “‘made by inmates from bits and
pieces of metal’ and sharpened against concrete.”  Id. n.1.  The Fourth Circuit added in a footnote 
that the court had “previously described a shank as a homemade knife or ‘a handmade sharp 
instrument.’”  Id.  (citing United States v. Caro, 597 F.3d 608, 610 (4th Cir.2010); United States v. 
Perry, 335 F.3d 316, 318 (4th Cir.2003)). 
92.  United States v. Mobley, 687 F.3d 625, 627(4th Cir. 2012).  “Prohibited object” was
defined in the statute to include weapons, controlled substances, currency, and telephones.  Id. at 
627.  The punishment for the offense was a fine or imprisonment for not more than five years, or 
15
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then able to charge Mobley as a career offender under section 4B1.1 of 
the guidelines because he had two prior felony convictions for controlled 
substance offenses.93  Mobley’s base offense level under the guidelines 
was 13, and after applying the career offender sentencing enhancement, 
this increased to 17.94  The level was then reduced by three for Mobley’s 
acceptance of responsibility, coming to a total of 14 for his base offense 
level.95  Mobley’s criminal history category was VI, and the advisory 
range for an offense level of 14 with a criminal history category of VI is 
37 to 46 months.96  Mobley was sentenced to 37 months.97  If the career 
offender provision had not been applied, Mobley’s sentencing range 
would have been 24 to 30 months.98 
At the sentencing hearing, Mobley objected to the use of the career 
offender enhancement, arguing that his conviction for possession of a 
prohibited object in prison did not qualify as a crime of violence.99  The 
court overruled this objection, finding that there is no passive possession 
of a weapon in a prison setting, and Mobley appealed.100  At the time of 
the instant offense, Mobley was serving a 151-month prison sentence for 
his prior federal convictions of possession with intent to distribute 
heroin and being a felon in possession of a firearm.101  On appeal, the 
Fourth Circuit affirmed the sentencing court’s ruling that Mobley’s 
conviction for possession of a prohibited object in prison did constitute a 
crime of violence.102  The court turned to Begay to guide its analysis and 
also examined the list of offenses considered crimes of violence in 
Application Note 1 to section 4B1.2.103  Relying on the Third Circuit’s 
position in Polk, Mobley argued that mere possession of a shank does 
not involve the active or assaultive conduct required of a crime of 
violence under the guidelines.104 
both.  Id. 
93.  Id.
94.  Id.
95.  Id.
96.  Id.
97.  United States v. Mobley, 687 F.3d 625, 626 (4th Cir. 2012). 
98.  Id. at 627.
99.  Id.
100.  Id. 
101.  Id. at 626. 
102.  Id. 
103.  United States v. Mobley, 687 F.3d 625, 626 (4th Cir. 2012).  The court also cited Sykes 
v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011), where the Supreme Court held that intentional vehicular 
flight was comparable in degree of risk to the enumerated offenses in the statute, specifically 
burglary and arson.  Id. 
104.  Id. at 628. 
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The court, however, rejected this argument, citing the majority 
positions of the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits.105  The court agreed 
with the Fifth Circuit’s analysis in Marquez that possession of a weapon 
in prison is similar in kind and in degree of risk posed to the crime of 
burglary because of the possibility of a face-to-face confrontation.106  
The court also relied heavily on the rulings in Boyce and Perez-Jiminez, 
where the Eighth and Tenth Circuits held that possession of a weapon in 
prison involves purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct because such 
possession creates the likelihood of future violent confrontations.107  
Furthermore, the court noted that there is no innocent purpose for the 
possession of a weapon by a prison inmate other than to attack or deter 
an attack, facilitating violence and injury.108  The court explained that 
even though possession of a weapon in prison may not involve the same 
kind of active violence and aggression reflected in some of the 
enumerated offenses, it does reflect a similar level of violence and 
aggression involved in possession of a sawed off shotgun, listed in 
Application Note 1 as a crime of violence.109  The court also added that 
possession of a weapon in prison involves a similar level of risk of 
violence involved in the crime of burglary, another enumerated 
offense.110  Therefore, the Fourth Circuit held that Mobley’s possession 
of a weapon in prison was a crime of violence.111 
However, Circuit Judge Wynn, persuaded by the Third Circuit’s 
minority position in Polk, wrote an equally long dissenting opinion.112  
The dissent stated that the mere possession of a weapon in prison is not a 
crime of violence because it is dissimilar to the enumerated offenses, and 
that at the very least, whether it is similar is ambiguous and therefore 
must be construed in the defendant’s favor.113  In analyzing whether 
possession of a weapon in prison involves purposeful, violent, or 
aggressive conduct, the dissent turned to Chambers v. United States.114  
In Chambers, the Supreme Court held that the crime of failure to report 
for penal confinement did not constitute a violent felony under the 
105.  Id. at 629. 
106.  Id. 
107.  Id. at 630. 
108.  Id. at 630-31. 
109.  United States v. Mobley, 687 F.3d 625, 630-31 (4th Cir. 2012). 
110.  Id.  The court explained that, “like the offense of burglary of a dwelling, the availability 
of contraband weapons in the prison context obviously facilitates violence and injury.”  Id. 
111.  Id. at 631. 
112.  Id. at 632 (Wynn, J., dissenting). 
113.  Id. 
114.  Id. at 633 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (citing Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009)). 
17
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ACCA.115  The Court stated that the offense was a form of inaction 
while the Mobley dissent likewise explained that possession of a weapon 
in prison is a form of inaction.116  The dissent agreed with the holding in 
Polk that there is a fundamental difference between the enumerated 
purposeful, violent, and aggressive offenses and a passive crime of mere 
possession.117  The Mobley dissent explained that merely the conviction 
of the offense of possession of a weapon in prison does not require that 
the prisoner attempt to harm anyone or threaten anyone with harm; a 
person can be guilty of the offense if the prisoner has a weapon to 
defend himself or if a weapon is simply discovered in his cell, and these 
actions do not initiate violence nor exhibit violent or aggressive 
conduct.118 
The dissent also criticized the majority’s position that because there 
is no innocent purpose for possession of a weapon in prison, such 
possession is a crime of violence.119  As the dissent explained, “the mere 
fact that an act is categorically unlawful does not necessarily render it a 
dangerous and provocative act that itself endangers others.”120  The 
majority’s holding was based largely on the idea that because a prisoner 
has no legitimate purpose to possess a weapon in prison, unlike a felon 
who may possess a weapon for recreational purposes, such possession is 
violent conduct.121  However, the dissent explained that while this 
conduct is clearly unlawful, its unlawfulness does not make it violent 
and aggressive.122 
Finally, the dissent stated that at the very least, the residual clause is 
ambiguous regarding whether possession of a weapon in prison 
constitutes a crime of violence.123  The dissent opined that there is 
ambiguity in the guidelines career offender provision, as the statute may 
115.  United States v. Mobley, 687 F.3d 625, 633 (4th Cir. 2012) (Wynn, J., dissenting). 
 116.  Id. (citing Chambers, 555 U.S. at 128).  The Mobley court compared failure to report to 
penal confinement in Chambers to possession of a weapon in prison, as both offenses “are a far cry 
from the purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct potentially at issue when an offender uses 
explosives against property, commits arson, or burgles a dwelling.”  Id. (quoting Chambers, 555 
U.S. at 128-29). 
117.  Mobley, 687 F.3d at 633 (Wynn, J., dissenting). 
118.  Id. at 634 (Wynn, J., dissenting). 
119.  Id. (Wynn, J., dissenting) 
120.  Id. (Wynn, J., dissenting) (quoting Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011)) 
(internal quotations omitted).  
121.  Id. at 634 (Wynn, J., dissenting). 
 122.  Id. (Wynn, J., dissenting).  The dissent also pointed out that a shank is not included in the 
list of narrowly defined weapons in § 4B1.2 comment 1 of the guidelines that Congress determined 
mere possession of would constitute a crime of violence.  Id. at 635 (Wynn, J., dissenting). 
123.  United States v. Mobley, 687 F.3d 625, 634 (4th Cir. 2012) (Wynn, J., dissenting). 
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be reasonably interpreted in two different ways.124  When such a statute 
is ambiguous, courts are required to apply the rule of lenity, which 
mandates resolving the conflict in the defendant’s favor.125  The dissent 
purported that the ACCA, which helps dictate the guidelines residual 
clause analysis, has very little legislative history and that the statute 
gives little guidance on what crimes it intends to cover.126  Because 
application of the ACCA and guidelines residual clauses has resulted in 
confusion among the courts, inmates may lack sufficient notice on which 
crimes may be considered crimes of violence.127  As such, the dissent 
concluded that such ambiguity and lack of notice obliges the court to 
apply the rule of lenity and rule in Mobley’s favor.128 
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Mobley Dissent Was Correct 
The Mobley majority made a crucial, yet common oversight when 
applying the Begay test to the crime of possession of a weapon in 
prison—the majority applied only the first prong of the Begay test, as it 
failed to examine whether the crime typically involves purposeful, 
violent, and aggressive conduct.  Other circuit courts, like the Mobley 
majority, have also made this mistake, only examining whether the risk 
involved in possessing a weapon in prison involves purposeful, violent, 
and aggressive conduct and not whether the conduct of the crime itself is 
purposeful, violent, and aggressive.129 
124.  Id. (Wynn, J., dissenting) 
 125.  Id. at 634 (Wynn, J., dissenting).  The court explained the rule of lenity as an important 
safeguard of defendants’ constitutional rights by ensuring that they receive notice “in language that 
the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.”  Id. at 
635 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (quoting Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmties. for a Great Or., 515 
U.S. 687, 704 n. 18 (1995)).  The dissent explained that a statute may not be ambiguous just because 
it is possible to articulate a construction more narrow than that urged by the government, or because 
there is a division of judicial scrutiny on its interpretation.  However, such circumstances may 
evidence ambiguity, especially when a statute can be reasonably interpreted in two different ways 
and the legislative history does not amount to much.  Id. at 635 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (quoting 
United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 436 (2009) (Roberts, J., dissenting)); Moskal v. United States, 
498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990)). 
126.  Id. at 636 (Wynn, J., dissenting).  To show the ambiguity present in the residual clause, 
the dissent pointed out that the four listed example crimes in the statute have very little in common, 
especially with respect to the level of risk of injury they pose, which has resulted in confusion 
among the circuit courts when applying the statute.  Id. (Wynn, J., dissenting) (quoting James v. 
United States, 550 U.S. 192, 229 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
127.  Id. (Wynn, J., dissenting) 
128.  Id. (Wynn, J., dissenting) 
129.  See Mobley, 687 F.3d at 626; Perez-Jiminez, 654 F.3d at 1140; Boyce, 633 F.3d at 709; 
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This section explains how the Mobley majority, along with the 
Marquez and Boyce majorities, incorrectly applied the Begay two-part 
test by merging the two prongs together, and why the Polk majority, the 
Marquez dissent, and the Mobley dissent were correct in their opinions. 
The Polk majority, the Marquez dissent, and the Mobley dissent properly 
applied the second prong of Begay by analyzing whether the conduct of 
possessing a weapon in prison, and not just the risk it imposes, typically 
involves purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.  The Polk majority 
also further illustrated why the crime of possession of a weapon in 
prison does not typically involve purposeful, violent, and aggressive 
conduct by looking to the opinions of other courts that applied the Begay 
test to similar possession crimes.130 
1. The Majority Misapplied the Begay Two-Part Test
The Mobley dissent came to the correct conclusion, as the crime of 
possession of a weapon in prison does not typically involve purposeful, 
violent, and aggressive conduct as required by Begay.131  The Mobley 
majority came to the incorrect holding because it misapplied the Begay 
two-part test.  While the majority properly found that the first prong of 
Begay was met, that the crime creates a serious potential risk of physical 
injury, it failed to recognize that the second prong, that the crime 
typically involves purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct, was not 
met.  The majority essentially lumped the two prongs together, as 
fulfillment of the first prong seemed to automatically fulfill the second 
prong.  Therefore, the majority ended up reverting back to and applying 
the pre-Begay test by simply analyzing whether the crime creates a risk 
of physical injury to another. 
When the Mobley majority explained the Begay test, the court 
stated that Begay limits crimes that should fall under the residual clause 
to crimes that are roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk 
posed, to the examples themselves (the enumerated crimes).132  While 
this is a correct statement, the majority failed to state the rest of the test 
mandated by Begay.  The test does require a court to determine whether 
a crime is similar in kind and in degree of risk posed to the enumerated 
crimes in the statute, however, the test does not end there.133  Begay 
Marquez, 626 F.3d at 223. 
130.  United States v. Polk, 577 F.3d 515, 519 (3d Cir. 2009). 
131.  United States v. Begay, 553 U.S. 137, 142 (2008). 
132.  Mobley, 687 F.3d at 628. 
133.  Begay, 553 U.S. at 143 (2008). 
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provided further guidance on how to determine whether an offense is 
similar to the enumerated crimes: “the listed crimes all typically involve 
purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.”134  It is clear from Begay 
that residual clause analysis is primarily guided by these three 
adjectives, as the Court stated that crimes involving purposeful, violent, 
and aggressive conduct are “characteristic of the armed career criminal, 
the eponym of the statute.”135  Furthermore, the Begay court based their 
holding on the fact that the crime of driving under the influence does not 
involve such conduct.136  The precedence that the Mobley majority cited 
also clearly mandates this two-part test.137  Such precedence explains 
that the second prong of whether the crime is similar to the enumerated 
crimes is fulfilled if the crime typically involves purposeful, violent, and 
aggressive conduct.138 
However, the second prong of Begay is not properly analyzed in 
Mobley, as the majority’s analysis of whether possession of a weapon in 
prison is similar to the enumerated crimes is limited to whether the 
offense creates a risk of violence.139  Because possession of a weapon in 
prison “obviously facilitates violence and injury,” the court held that the 
offense is similar to the enumerated crimes.140  However, in analyzing 
whether the offense is similar to the enumerated crimes, they failed to 
address whether the crime typically involves purposeful, violent, and 
aggressive conduct.141  The Mobley court analyzed only the first prong 
of the Begay test, explaining that possession of a weapon in prison 
creates a risk of injury by “creating a likelihood of future violent 
confrontations.”142 
2. The Offense of Possession of a Weapon in Prison Does Not
Typically Involve Purposeful, Violent, and Aggressive Conduct 
Polk correctly analyzed whether possession of a weapon in prison 
constitutes a crime of violence under the Begay two-part test by 
accurately applying the second prong, which the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth 
Circuits, along with Mobley, failed to do.  The Fifth Circuit in Marquez 
134.  Id. 
135.  Id. at 145. 
136.  Id. 
137.  United States v. Boyce, 633 F.3d 708, 711 (8th Cir. 2011). 
138.  Id. 
139.  United States v. Mobley, 687 F.3d 625, 631 (4th Cir. 2012). 
140.  Id. 
141.  Id. at 630. 
142.  Id. 
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and the Eighth Circuit in Boyce both applied the second prong 
incorrectly.143  While the Marquez and Boyce courts did not ignore the 
second prong, as the Mobley majority did, the courts did not analyze 
whether the specific conduct involved in the crime—the conduct of 
possession—typically involves purposeful, violent, and aggressive 
conduct.  Instead, these courts only analyzed whether the risk of the 
crime involves such conduct.144  The Boyce court stated that the second 
prong is met, as the “offense was also both violent and aggressive 
because it created the possibility—even likelihood—of a future violent 
confrontation.”145  Similarly, the Marquez court held that the crime 
involves purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct because a prisoner 
in possession of a weapon in prison is more likely to attack or physically 
resist an apprehender, such as a guard or another inmate.146  These courts 
confused the analysis called for in the second prong by repeating the 
analysis of the first prong—looking at the risk imposed by the crime—
instead of analyzing the conduct of the crime as described in the statute. 
The Polk majority, the Marquez dissent, and the Mobley dissent 
accurately applied the second prong of the Begay test by analyzing the 
conduct of the crime, and not just the risk it imposes.  The Marquez 
dissent recognized the majority’s flawed application of the second prong 
of Begay, as the opinion pointed out that “a crime of violence depends 
on conduct that is at once purposeful, violent, and aggressive, not just 
purposeful and potentially violent.”147  The Mobley dissent also 
acknowledged that the conduct of possession of a weapon in prison only 
presents the risk of violence, and does not in itself involve violent or 
aggressive conduct, as it is a passive crime of mere possession.148  The 
Third Circuit in Polk efficiently summarized why the second prong of 
Begay is not met: “While possession of a weapon in prison is purposeful, 
in that we may assume one who possesses a shank intends that 
possession, it cannot properly be characterized as conduct that is itself 
aggressive or violent, as only the potential exists for aggressive or 
violent conduct.”149 
 143.  See Boyce, 633 F.3d 708 (8th Cir. 2011), United States v. Marquez, 626 F.3d 214 (5th 
Cir. 2010). 
 144.  See Boyce, 633 F.3d at 712 (quoting United States v. Vincent, 575 F.3d 820, 827 (8th Cir. 
2009)), Marquez, 626 F.3d at 221. 
145.  Boyce, 633 F.3d at 712 (quoting United States v. Vincent, 575 F.3d 820, 827 (8th Cir. 
2009)). 
146.  Marquez, 626 F.3d at 221 (5th Cir. 2010). 
147.  Id. at 227 (Dennis, J., dissenting). 
148.  Mobley, 687 F.3d at 625 (Wynn, J., dissenting). 
149.  United States v. Polk, 577 F.3d 515, 519 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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To analyze whether the conduct involved in the crime of possession 
of a weapon in prison involves purposeful, violent, and aggressive 
conduct, the Third Circuit turned to cases where courts analyzed whether 
the crime of carrying a concealed weapon constituted a crime of 
violence, as these two crimes involve essentially the same conduct.150  In 
United States v. Archer, the Eleventh Circuit applied the Begay two-part 
test to the crime of carrying a concealed weapon.151 Archer held that 
while the crime is purposeful, as the person presumably intends to 
possess the weapon, carrying a concealed weapon does not involve 
aggressive or violent conduct.152  The court explained that the crime is a 
passive crime consisting of only possession, rather than any overt action 
such as the acts involved in burglary and arson, which are violent acts 
aimed at other persons or property.153  Polk and the Marquez and Mobley 
dissents explained that possession of a weapon in prison does in fact 
create the risk of danger; however, the Archer court further clarified the 
difference between a risk of danger and an overt act involving violent or 
aggressive conduct.154  The Archer court stated, “we do not wish to 
minimize the danger that possession may quickly transform into use, 
especially when the firearm is readily accessible, however, the act of 
possession does not, without more, involve any aggressive or violent 
behavior.”155 
Like the crime of possession of a weapon in prison, appeals courts 
are split over the issue of whether carrying a concealed weapon is a 
crime of violence under the guidelines.156  The analysis and arguments 
coming from the majority view that possession of a concealed weapon is 
not a crime of violence are persuasive on why possession of a weapon in 
prison is not a crime of violence.  Scholars have pointed out that the 
enumerated crimes in the guidelines’ provision all require “an 
affirmative act that produces a primary harm to another,” and that the 
150.  Id. 
151.  United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1351 (11th Cir. 2008). 
152.  Id. 
153.  Id. 
154.  Id. 
155.  Id. 
156.  Eriksen, supra note 7, at 823.  The Eleventh Circuit held that possession of a concealed 
weapon without a license was a crime of violence because such action goes beyond mere 
possession, as “the person has taken the extra step of having the weapon immediately accessible for 
use on another.”  Id. at 825 (quoting United States v. Hall, 77 F.3d 398 (11th Cir. 1996)).  However, 
the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have held that carrying a concealed weapon is not a crime of violence, 
arguing that, “although carrying an illegal weapon may involve a continuing risk to others, the harm 
is not so immediate as to present a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”  Id. at 823 
(quoting United States v. Whitfield, 907 F.2d 798, 800 (8th Cir. 1990)). 
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crime of carrying a concealed weapon does not contain such a “primary 
harm to another.”157  In United States v. Lane, Judge Posner explained 
that carrying a concealed weapon is dissimilar to the enumerated 
crimes.158  Judge Posner pointed to “the logical disconnect between what 
may happen and what has happened, and that while possession of a 
firearm may lead to violence, no violence has actually occurred.”159  
Because no violence has actually occurred, no primary harm to another 
has occurred, unlike the crimes of burglary, arson, extortion, or the use 
of explosives.  Similarly, when an inmate possesses a weapon in prison, 
“the opportunity for violence is available, but no overt act with a 
primary harm has been inflicted upon another.”160  The aim of outlawing 
concealed weapons without a permit is not to curb a wrong against a 
person or property, but instead to deter a person from having an 
instrument to commit such a wrong in the future.161  The aim of 
preventing inmates from possessing weapons is the same—to deter 
violence among inmates in the future. 
While Judge Posner’s analysis does not consider whether carrying a 
concealed weapon typically involves purposeful, violent, and aggressive 
conduct, his analysis is persuasive on why the crimes of possession of a 
weapon in prison and carrying a concealed weapon, mere possession 
offenses, are not crimes of violence.  The evaluation that the enumerated 
crimes in the guidelines statute all have 1) an overt act which, 2) 
produces a primary harm to another, further shows the dissimilarity 
between the enumerated crimes and crimes of mere possession.162  
Possession crimes do not involve violent or aggressive conduct.  The 
opportunity for violence is insufficient to qualify as a crime of violence 
under Begay; there must also be purposeful, violent, and aggressive 
157.  Eriksen, supra note 7, at 827. 
158.  Id. at 831 (citing United States v. Lane, 252 F.3d 905, 907 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
159.  Id. at 831 (citing United States v. Lane, 252 F.3d 905, 907 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
160.  Id. 
161.  Id. at 818.  Eriksen argued that the intent of the drafters of the career criminal act was to 
treat certain property crimes that create a serious potential risk of physical violence, but that do not 
actually have physical violence, in a similar manner as if the physical violence actually happened.  
Id. at 828.  He pointed out that to be convicted of carrying a concealed weapon, a person must 
simply have a weapon on or about his person, the weapon must be hidden from common 
observation, and be readily accessible for use.  Id. at 829-30.  The crime does not require physical 
injury to a person or damage to another’s property.  Id. at 830.  The crime in fact requires 
concealment; therefore, others do not even know the offender is carrying a weapon, and thus have 
not been affected.  Id.  Therefore, the crime of carrying a concealed weapon should not be a crime 
of violence under the statute, because it is too dissimilar from the enumerated crimes, which have an 
overt act producing a primary harm to another.  Id. 
162.  Id. at 827. 
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conduct, and possession of a weapon in prison and possession of a 
concealed weapon lack violent and aggressive conduct.163 
B. The Begay Standard: Raising More Questions Than Answers 
Application of the ACCA’s violent felony residual clause has 
always been a challenge for courts.164  The Supreme Court has struggled 
to develop a standard that will further the purpose of the ACCA—to 
keep violent criminals from having firearms.165  As scholars have noted, 
“confusion reigns in federal courts over whether crimes qualify as 
violent felonies for the purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act.”166  
Circuits are split over whether several crimes, including escape from a 
penal institution, carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of a 
weapon in prison, are crimes of violence.167  After Begay, where the 
Court attempted to clarify the proper analysis under the ACCA residual 
clause, the answer is much less clear.168 
Courts have had trouble applying the second prong of the Begay 
standard, requiring a crime to typically involve purposeful, violent, and 
aggressive conduct.169  Many variations to the Begay test have been 
suggested because “with only those three imprecise adjectives to guide 
them, district and circuit courts released a flurry of misguided and 
confused decisions in the wake of Begay.”170  Specifically, the Begay 
standard has proven unworkable because the terms “violent” and 
“aggressive,” non-legal terms, are not defined in the opinion.171  
Furthermore, while it is simple to identify whether a person’s conduct on 
a specific occasion is violent or aggressive, it is more complicated to 
determine whether a crime typically entails such conduct, as it is 
necessary to think through the many varieties of behavior within a 
163.  United States v. Begay, 553 U.S. 137, 143 (2008). 
164.  See generally Montgomery, supra note 21, at 719. 
165.  Id. at 719. 
166.  David C. Holman, Violent Crimes and Known Associates: The Residual Clause of the 
Armed Career Criminal Act, 43 CONN. L. REV. 209, 210 (2010) (internal quotations omitted). 
167.  Id. 
168.  Montgomery, supra note 21, at 715. 
169.  Id. at 723. 
170.  Id. at 723. 
171.  Id. at 724.  Furthermore, Holman noted that the formula of requiring a crime to be 
purposeful, violent, and aggressive in order to be considered a crime of violence is imprecise and 
has resulted in the exclusion of some very risky crimes of recklessness and negligence; it is under 
inclusive.  Holman, supra note 166, at 210.  He further argued that, “the residual clause is 
problematic because lower federal courts are torn between the text of the ACCA, a complex 
analysis known as the categorical approach, and the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Begay v. 
United States.”  Id. at 213. 
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criminal statute.172  Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Begay identified this 
problem.173  He argued that the majority “failed to provide a complete 
framework that will embrace all future cases,” and that the Court 
continued to take a “piecemeal, suspenseful, Scrabble-like approach” to 
residual clause analysis.174  Furthermore, while the ACCA residual 
clause analysis has always applied to analysis of the guidelines’ residual 
clause, Begay created a conflict between the ACCA and the guidelines 
by requiring that a violent crime be purposeful.175  Commentary to the 
guidelines states that manslaughter is a crime of violence; however, 
manslaughter does not have to be purposeful.176  Remedying all of the 
problems associated with residual clause analysis under Begay is beyond 
the scope of this Note.  However, it is clear that until the Supreme Court 
determines a new standard, lower courts have two options: to continue to 
have conflicting holdings, or to manipulate the standard to create 
uniformity in regards to the crimes which have resulted in circuit splits, 
such as the crime of possession of a weapon in prison. 
C. Better Standard: Presumption of Non-Violence, and Application of a 
Limited Fact-Based Standard to Overcome the Presumption 
Until the Supreme Court modifies the Begay test or establishes a 
clearer standard, this Note proposes a variation on the Begay standard in 
regards to the crime of possession of a weapon in prison.  If courts 
 172.  Id. at 225.  Holman noted that while the terms “violent” and “purposeful” are often used 
in state and federal statutes, “aggressive” has no common legal use or definition.  Aside from 
driving provisions, which have a very specific legal use of “aggressive” driving, no other state 
statutes define the term.  Given the varying uses of the word, some could find it is synonymous with 
the word “violent.”  However, the Supreme Court chose to use both words in the Begay test, making 
it unclear how the two words differ and what additional elements a crime must require in order to be 
a violent felony.  Id. 
173.  Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 149 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
 174.  Montgomery, supra note 21, at 724 (quoting Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 149 
(2008) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
175.  Holman, supra note 166, at 237.  Holman identified three other major problems in the 
implementation of the Begay test.  Id. at 231.  First, by requiring that the crimes be purposeful, the 
test appeared to require specific intent for a crime to fall under the residual clause.  Id.  This would 
result in crimes with a mens rea of negligence or recklessness to be excluded as violent felonies 
even if the crimes presented a serious potential risk of injury.  Id.  Lower courts following the Begay 
test have excluded such negligent and reckless crimes from the residual clause, leading to absurd 
results such as a holding that negligent vehicular homicide is not a violent felony.  Id.  Second, the 
combination of the Begay test requiring that a crime be purposeful, violent, and aggressive and the 
categorical approach excludes sex crimes against children that present a serious potential risk of 
physical injury.  Id.  Third, many courts have searched for an “ordinary case” or a “likely shooter” 
using “little more than their imaginations, intuitions, and varied use of statistics” to determine if a 
crime is a violent felony.  Id. at 231. 
176.  Id. at 237. 
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correctly apply the Begay test to the crime of possession of a weapon in 
prison, courts would find it is not a crime of violence, as it is neither 
violent nor aggressive.  Yet, district and circuit courts have been 
reaching and confusing the test in order to hold that possession of a 
weapon is a crime of violence.177  Thus, there are situations where courts 
feel that a certain prisoner in possession of a weapon in prison is 
particularly violent.178  I propose that there be a presumption that the 
crime of possession of a weapon in prison is not a crime of violence 
under the ACCA and guidelines’ residual clauses, since correctly 
applying the Begay test results in that holding.179  However, courts 
should have the opportunity to look at certain facts to overcome the 
presumption, since many courts have disregarded or stretched the Begay 
test to hold that possession of a weapon in prison is a crime of 
violence.180  These facts should include the criminal history of the 
prisoner, what kind of weapon and how many weapons the prisoner had, 
the past behavior of the prisoner in prison as shown by official records, 
and the environment of the prison.  If the prosecution establishes by a 
preponderance of the evidence that at least three out of the four facts 
show that the prisoner is violent, then the presumption is overcome and 
the crime will be considered a crime of violence.  For example, the 
prisoner may have a violent criminal history, a history of violence in 
prison as shown by official prison records, or he may have possessed 
multiple weapons or especially deadly weapons.  Finally, the 
prosecution may also show that the prison is a generally non-violent 
prison where a prisoner would have no need to have a weapon for self-
defense. 
1. Why There Should Be a Presumption of Non-Violence
While Mobley along with the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits held 
that possession of a weapon in prison constituted a crime of violence 
under the guidelines’ residual clause, these courts have distorted the 
Begay two-part test.181  Correctly applying the Begay standard shows 
 177.  See generally supra Part IV.A.  United States v. Perez-Jiminez, 654 F.3d 1136, 1140 
(10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Boyce, 633 F.3d 708, 709 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Marquez, 626 F.3d 214, 223 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 178.  See Perez-Jiminez, 654 F.3d at 1140; Boyce, 633 F.3d at 709; Marquez, 626 F.3d 214, 
223 (5th Cir. 2010). 
179.  See generally supra Part IV.A. 
180.  See Perez-Jiminez, 654 F.3d at 1140; Boyce, 633 F.3d at 709; Marquez, 626 F.3d at 223. 
181.  See generally supra Part IV.A; Perez Jiminez, 654 F.3d at 1140; Boyce, 633 F.3d at 709; 
Marquez, 626 F.3d at 223. 
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that possession of a weapon in prison is neither violent nor aggressive.182  
The courts in Mobley, Perez-Jiminez, Boyce, and Marquez relied on the 
assertion that a prisoner in possession of a weapon is more likely to 
attack someone.183  The courts also repeatedly stated that the possession 
creates the possibility or likelihood of a future violent confrontation in 
order to support the holding that the crime is violent and aggressive.184  
However, as Judge Posner pointed out, “a crime that increases the 
likelihood of a crime of violence need not itself be a crime of 
violence.”185 
Courts that held that possession of a weapon in prison is a crime of 
violence misapplied the Begay test, as they merged the first prong of the 
test, that the crime creates a serious potential risk of physical injury, with 
the second prong, that the crime typically involves purposeful, violent, 
and aggressive conduct.186  Instead of analyzing whether the conduct of 
the crime as described in the statute typically involves purposeful, 
violent, and aggressive conduct, the courts analyzed whether the risk of 
the crime involves such conduct.187  The conduct of the crime of 
possession of a weapon in prison as described by the statute is simple to 
identify—it is possession of that weapon, and nothing more.188  To be 
guilty of possession of a weapon in prison, the prisoner need not initiate 
hostilities or attacks, nor engage in threatening behavior, nor even 
attempt to harm anyone.189  The prisoners only need to possess, whether 
on their person, or in their cell, a weapon.  They can even be charged 
with the crime if a weapon is found in their cell during a search when 
they are not present.190  The act of possession alone simply is not violent 
182.  See United States v. Polk, 577 F.3d 515, 517 (3d Cir. 2009). 
183.  Marquez, 626 F.3d at 221; Boyce, 633 F.3d at 712. 
184.  Marquez, 626 F.3d at 221; Boyce, 633 F.3d at 712. 
185.  Eriksen, supra note 7, at 830 (quoting United States v. Lane, 252 F.3d 905, 907 (7th Cir. 
2001)) (internal quotations omitted).  In Lane, in an opinion holding that felony possession of a 
firearm is not a crime of violence, Judge Posner explained that while a felon is more likely to make 
an illegal use of a firearm than a non-felon, there is no evidence that the risk of such is “substantial.”  
Lane, 252 F.3d at 906 (7th Cir. 2001).  Judge Posner further pointed out that ex-felons “have the 
same motives as lawful possessors of firearms to possess a firearm—self-defense, hunting, gun 
collecting, and target practice.”  Id. 
 186.  See generally supra Part IV.A.2; United States v. Mobley, 687 F.3d 625, 626 (4th Cir. 
2012); Perez-Jiminez, 654 F.3d at 1140; Boyce, 633 F.3d at 709; Marquez, 626 F.3d at 223. 
 187.  See generally supra Part IV.A.2; Mobley, 687 F.3d at 626; Perez-Jiminez, 654 F.3d at 
1140; Boyce, 633 F.3d at 709; Marquez, 626 F.3d at 223. 
188.  18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(2). 
189.  Mobley, 687 F.3d at 634 (Wynn, J., dissenting). 
190.  Id.  The dissenting opinion pointed out that the government conceded at oral argument 
that their reasoning would allow a prosecutor to seek enhanced sentencing of a defendant under the 
crime of violence statute if a weapon is discovered in the prisoner’s cell during a search for which 
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or aggressive. 
Although under the correct application of the Begay test, possession 
of a weapon in prison is not a crime of violence, until the Supreme Court 
crafts a clearer standard, courts should hold that there is simply a 
presumption that possession of a weapon in prison is not a crime of 
violence.  There should be a presumption because the Fifth, Eighth, and 
Tenth Circuits have distorted the Begay test, and courts have found ways 
around the test in order to hold that possession of a weapon in prison is 
violent, such as the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Perez-Jiminez.191  
Because circuit courts have consistently misapplied or ignored the Begay 
test192 to hold that possession of a weapon in prison is a crime of 
violence, in some circumstances judges must feel that the possession is 
in fact violent.  Therefore, the holding that possession of a weapon in 
prison is a crime of violence should merely be a presumption. 
Although the Mobley majority cited Perez-Jiminez as support for 
holding that possession of a weapon in prison is a crime of violence, the 
Tenth Circuit in Perez-Jiminez didn’t even apply the Begay test.193  The 
Tenth Circuit did not apply the Begay test, although it was the 
controlling precedent, by factually distinguishing the case.  The Begay 
standard, which used a categorical approach, was applied to a prior 
offense in Begay, and because the offense in Perez-Jiminez was an 
instant offense, the court stated that the Begay test and categorical 
approach did not apply.194  To hold that the defendant’s possession of a 
weapon in prison was a crime of violence, the Tenth Circuit looked to 
the facts of the case—that the weapons were two shanks, about five-and-
a-half inches long and sharpened to a point.195  Although the court 
apparently did not take into account the defendant’s criminal history, it 
was included in the opinion that the defendant had a prior conviction of 
possessing a weapon in prison where he stabbed another inmate five 
times with a converted box cutter.196  The court also took into account 
the fact that the prison the defendant was in was an “inherently 
he was not even present.  Id.  The dissent argued that “this scenario is particularly troubling because 
it would allow for enhanced sentencing of a defendant who leaves a shank in his cell, declining to 
carry it with him where it could arguably endanger others, on the grounds that he has committed a 
‘crime of violence.’”  Id. 
 191.  Perez-Jiminez, 654 F.3d at 1140; see also Mobley, 687 F.3d at 626; Boyce, 633 F.3d at 
709; Marquez, 626 F.3d at 223. 
192.  See Mobley, 687 F.3d at 626; Boyce, 633 F.3d at 709; Marquez, 626 F.3d at 223. 
193.  Perez-Jiminez, 654 F.3d at 1141. 
194.  Id. at 1142. 
195.  Id. 
196.  Id. 
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dangerous place.”197  By applying a presumption that possession of a 
weapon in prison is not a crime of violence, as that is the correct holding 
under Begay, courts would not have to stretch the Begay test.  Nor would 
courts need to look for other precedent or facts that allow them to 
disregard the Begay test, as the Perez-Jiminez court did.  Instead of 
applying an array of different standards and tests, a court would follow 
the Begay test by holding that there is a presumption that the possession 
of the weapon is not a crime of violence.  The prosecution would then 
have the opportunity to overcome this presumption by looking at some 
of the same facts that the Tenth Circuit did—the environment the 
prisoner was in, the weapon itself, and the prisoner’s criminal history—
without creating a confusing test that is at odds with other tests applied 
in different courts.198 
2. To Overcome the Presumption, Courts Should Apply a Limited
Fact-Based Standard 
When doing residual-clause analysis with the several “problem” 
crimes that have resulted in circuit splits, several courts and scholars 
have proposed and applied a limited fact-based standard.199  These 
“problem crimes” include statutory rape, felony possession of a firearm, 
and possession of a weapon in prison.200  While most courts apply a 
strict categorical approach in this analysis, scholars have suggested that 
a limited fact-based approach should apply.201  Using this approach, 
courts would limit their inquiry to facts from which a serious risk of 
physical injury to another could be inferred.202  A pure fact-based 
approach has been criticized because of its inefficiency in requiring a 
sentencing court to examine all the facts surrounding the conviction and 
because it may force the court to base a determination on facts that have 
merely been alleged.203  The categorical approach has been criticized 
197.  Id. at 1142. 
198.  Id. at 1140. 
199.  See Riley, supra note 45, at 1507; Fleischmann, supra note 56, at 425; Montgomery, 
supra note 21, at 715; Castor, supra note 7, at 345; United States v. Lipscomb, 619 F.3d 474 (5th 
Cir. 2010); United States v. Riggans, 254 F.3d 1200 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 200.  See Riley, supra note 45, at 1507; Fleischmann, supra note 56, at 425; Montgomery, 
supra note 21, at 715; Castor, supra note 7, at 345; United States v. Lipscomb, 619 F.3d 474 (5th 
Cir. 2010); United States v. Riggans, 254 F.3d 1200 (10th Cir. 2001). 
201.  Riley, supra note 45, at 1518. 
202.  Id. 
203.  Id. at 1523.  Riley explained that a pure fact-based approach is also unfair because it 
leads to uncertainty about the sentence that will be imposed, and it allows sentencing courts to retry 
defendants’ prior convictions.  Id. 
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because of its unfairness in leading to arbitrary decisions based only on 
the statutory language instead of the defendant’s conduct.204  
Specifically, the Begay categorical approach looks at the statutory 
language and whether the crime as described in the statute typically 
involves purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct, which has resulted 
in unfair and conflicting decisions.205  A limited fact-based approach 
would alleviate both the unfairness and inefficiency of the fact-based 
and categorical approaches.206  By examining and requiring proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence of only the specific facts, “the limited 
fact-based approach conserves the court’s time and resources.”207  These 
facts would include the criminal history of the prisoner, what kind of 
weapon and how many weapons the prisoner had, the past official 
behavior record of the prisoner in that prison, and the environment of the 
prison.  If such facts are not available for the court to review, the 
presumption will not be overcome and the possession will not be 
considered a crime of violence.  However, it is unlikely that the court 
would not have access to these four facts.  The court will easily be able 
to establish what the weapon was from the charging papers, the past 
behavior of the inmate in prison from official prison records, the 
criminal history of the prisoner from court records, and the environment 
of the prison from statistics showing facts such as the number of violent 
incidents inside the prison each year. 
A limited fact-based approach has been proposed for residual 
clause analysis of the crime of statutory rape, where the sentencing court 
would examine only the age of the victim, the age disparity between the 
defendant and the victim, and the relationship of the parties involved.208  
These facts, like the suggested facts to examine for possession of a 
weapon in prison, are easy to obtain and unlikely to be contested, 
therefore, avoiding the unfairness found in basing the determination on 
facts that are merely alleged.209  Furthermore, a limited fact-based 
204.  Id. 
 205.  Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144 (2008); see Montgomery, supra note 21, at 
723-24. 
206.  Riley, supra note 45, at 1523. 
207.  Id.  Riley stated that a limited fact-based approach conserves the court’s resources 
because it limits inquiry to specific facts indicative of conduct that presents a serious potential risk 
of physical injury to another.  See also United States v. Lipscomb, 619 F.3d 474, 483 (King, J., 
concurring).  Furthermore, requiring proof of the four facts by a preponderance of the evidence 
comports with the approach suggested in United States v. Brien, in which the concurring opinion 
stated that sentencing facts can be proved to a judge at a sentencing hearing by a preponderance of 
the evidence.  United States v. Brien, 130 S. Ct. 2169, 2174 (2010). 
208.  Riley, supra note 45, at 1518. 
209.  Id. at 1523.  Riley explained that the age of the victim is easily discovered because it is an 
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standard avoids the arbitrariness present in the categorical approach, as 
“it allows the sentencing judge to more accurately determine whether a 
particular defendant truly poses a danger to society,” which is the main 
goal behind the career offender provision.210 
Various circuits have approved a limited factual inquiry when 
doing residual clause analysis.211  The Tenth Circuit in United States v. 
Riggans recognized the difficulty of determining whether a crime was 
violent when the elements of the crime in the statute, bank larceny, did 
not include any element of force or violence.212  While the controlling 
precedent at time, which was pre-Begay, followed the categorical 
approach, the Tenth Circuit held that examining the facts surrounding 
the incident was appropriate when examining an instant offense.213  Post-
Begay, some circuit judges continued to argue for a limited fact-based 
approach.  The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Lipscomb, which cited 
Riggans in the concurring opinion, argued that it was permissible for the 
sentencing court to inquire as to the length of the firearm in a felony 
possession of firearm case.214  The Lipscomb concurrence expressed 
approval for a sentencing court to make a factual finding as to the 
characteristics of the firearm possessed, as long as those characteristics 
were charged in the indictment.215  Such facts would therefore usually be 
element of the crime of statutory rape, and is sometimes contained in the charging papers.  Id. at 
1523-24.  Furthermore, even if it is not, this fact can be obtained at a very short evidentiary hearing.  
Id. at 1524.  The age disparity between the offender and the victim is also easily obtainable because 
the defendant’s age or date of birth is most likely contained in police records.  Id. Lastly, while the 
relationship between the parties may require more judicial resources, this fact could be an element 
under the statute and therefore found in the information or indictment.  Id.  Even if it is not, the 
court could examine family records or hear testimony to determine this fact.  Id. 
 210.  Fleischmann, supra note 56, at 432.  Several courts and scholars have suggested 
following a limited fact-based approach when doing residual clause analysis with various crimes, as 
application of a strict categorical approach and the Begay test sometimes do not comport with the 
original goal of the ACCA—to keep violent individuals from possessing guns.  Montgomery, supra 
note 21, at 735. 
 211.  See United States v. Lipscomb, 619 F.3d 474 (5th Cir. 2010) (King, J., concurring); 
United States v. Riggans, 254 F.3d 1200 (10th Cir. 2001). 
212.  Riggans, 254 F.3d at 1200. 
213.  Id. at 1203-04. 
214.  Lipscomb, 619 F.3d at 483 (King, J., concurring).  The concurring opinion stated that the 
elements of a crime must be charged in an indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt; however, sentencing facts can be proved to a judge at a sentencing hearing by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Id. (citing United States v. Brien, 130 S. Ct. 2169, 2174 (2010)). 
 215.  Id. at 484 (King, J., concurring).  The concurrence pointed out that the text of the 
sentencing guidelines statute refers to the defendant’s “conduct” rather than a particular “element” 
of the crime.  Id.  The concurrence also cited Shepard v. United States, where the Court stated that a 
sentencing court was free to look to the transcript of plea colloquy or a written plea agreement in 
determining whether the plea had necessarily rested on the fact that qualified the conviction as a 
predicate offense.  Id. (citing Shepherd v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 21 (2005)). 
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readily obtainable, like the proposed factual inquiries for possession of a 
weapon in prison.216 
Some courts have also pointed out the benefits of a limited fact-
based approach when doing residual clause analysis for the crime of 
escape from a penal institution, such as in United States v. Harris.217  
Although violence is not always present in escape from a penal 
institution, courts struggled with residual clause analysis because the 
potential for violence exists, just as with the charge of possession of 
weapon in prison.218  Because not all escape offenses involve violent 
conduct, scholars argued that courts should apply a limited fact-based 
approach by inquiring as to the type of custody from which the 
defendant escaped, and the means by which he escaped.219  It is unlikely 
that the parties would disagree as to the nature of these facts at trial; 
therefore, a court would have access to reasonably accurate information 
when making its ruling on the crime of violence issue.220  The same 
holds true for the factual inquiries for a possession of weapon in prison 
charge.  The facts of the criminal history of the defendant, the kind and 
number of weapons, the official behavior record of the defendant in 
prison, and the general environment of the prison, are generally non-
contestable, as they are obtainable from records and the indictment. 
Therefore, courts can avoid making arbitrary decisions based on the 
216.  Id. 
 217.  Castor, supra note 7, at 355 (citing United States v. Harris, 165 F.3d 1062 (6th Cir. 
1999)).  In United States v. Harris, the court ultimately held that the escape offense did constitute a 
crime of violence.  The court only considered the indictment in their determination; however, they 
stated that, “there might be cases in which some other type of limited factual inquiry would be 
appropriate.”  Harris, 165 F.3d at 1068.  The court in United States v. Thomas also discussed the 
possible utility of another approach, besides the categorical approach, in residual clause analysis of 
escape from a penal institution.  United States v. Thomas, 333 F.3d 280 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  The court 
suggested that the categorical analysis is flawed, as although the process of detaining an escapee 
may give rise to a potential risk of harm to others, such a risk is present in the capture of anyone 
who breaks the law; it therefore follows that all crimes would become crimes of violence. Castor, 
supra note 7, at 356 (citing United States v. Thomas, 333 F.3d 280 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). 
218.  Castor, supra note 7, at 357.  Castor stated that there is a risk of violence in escape from a 
penal institution because an escapee is “likely to possess a variety of supercharged emotions, and in 
evading those trying to recapture him, may feel threatened by police officers, ordinary citizens, or 
even fellow escapees.”  Id. (quoting United States v. Gosling, 39 F.3d 1140, 1142 (10th Cir. 1994)) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 219.  Castor, supra note 7, at 365.  Castor explained that not all escape offenses involve violent 
conduct because whether violence occurs largely depends on the circumstances of the escape.  Id.  
This includes the facility from which the defendant escaped from; an individual who escaped from a 
pre-release program such as a halfway house or community-based residential facility is much less 
likely to use violence, as he can simply not return to the facility in order to “escape”—the majority 
of escapes from pre-release programs are “walk-aways” that do not use violence.  Id. at 359. 
220.  Id. at 366. 
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wording of a statute. 
Looking at the defendant’s individual characteristics and criminal 
history at the sentencing stage is not a new concept, as courts already do 
so as mandated by the guidelines.221  Under the guidelines, the offense 
level will be adjusted up or down depending on several facts, including 
whether the defendant has a criminal history.222  Furthermore, some 
courts have already integrated the defendant’s criminal history into their 
residual clause analysis for possession of a weapon in prison.223  In a 
pre-Begay case, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Robles-Rodriguez 
took into account the defendant’s criminal history.224  The fact that the 
defendant had prior convictions for delivery of cocaine and assault with 
a deadly weapon aided the Fifth Circuit in its analysis of whether the 
defendant’s possession of a weapon in prison was a crime of violence.225  
A defendant with a violent criminal history, such as the defendant in 
Robles-Rodriguez, could be more dangerous when possessing a weapon 
in prison, and this fact should be part of the analysis. 
The ACCA also recognizes the importance of identifying the 
criminal history of the defendant at the sentencing stage.226  Begay 
pointed out that in order to determine who falls within the ACCA, the 
act looks to past crimes “because an offender’s criminal history is 
relevant to the question of whether he is a career criminal, or, more 
 221.  U.S.S.G § 4A1.1 (1987).  Section 1B1.4 of the sentencing guidelines, which governs 
what information may be used to impose a sentence, states: “In determining the sentence to impose 
within the guideline range, or whether a departure from the guidelines is warranted, the court may 
consider, without limitation, any information concerning the background, character and conduct of 
the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law.” U.S.S.G § 1B1.4 (1987).  Section 4A1.1 of the 
guidelines, the criminal history category, states: 
The total points from subsections (a) through (e) determine the criminal history category 
in the Sentencing Table in Chapter Five, Part A.  (a) Add 3 points for each prior sentence 
of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month.  (b) Add 2 points for each prior sen-
tence of imprisonment of at least sixty days not counted in (a).  (c) Add 1 point for each 
prior sentence not counted in (a) or (b), up to a total of 4 points for this subsection.  (d) 
Add 2 points if the defendant committed the instant offense while under any criminal 
justice sentence, including probation, parole, supervised release, imprisonment, work re-
lease, or escape status.  (e) Add 1 point for each prior sentence resulting from a convic-
tion of a crime of violence that did not receive any points under (a), (b), or (c) above be-
cause such sentence was counted as a single sentence, up to a total of 3 points for this 
subsection. 
U.S.S.G § 4A1.1 (1987). 
222.  U.S.S.G § 4A1.1 (1987). 
 223.  See United States v. Robles-Rodriguez, 204 Fed. Appx. 504, 505 (5th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Thomas, 183 Fed. Appx. 742, 743 (10th Cir. 2006). 
224.  Robles-Rodriguez, 204 Fed. Appx. at 505. 
225.  Id. 
226.  United States v. Zuniga, 553 F.3d 1330, 1336 (10th Cir. 2009). 
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precisely, to the kind or degree of danger the offender would pose were 
he to possess a gun.”227  The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Zuniga 
believed that the defendant’s criminal history and the purpose of the 
ACCA were significant in determining whether the defendant’s 
possession of a weapon in prison constituted a crime of violence under 
the residual clause.228  The court explained that “Mr. Zuniga’s 
convictions include felony manslaughter, felony assault with a 
dangerous weapon, and possession of a deadly weapon in prison.  His 
criminal history indicates that he would likely pose significant danger 
were he to possess a gun.”229  Examining a defendant’s criminal history 
is helpful in crime of violence determinations, as courts have already 
begun to take this fact into account.  If a defendant has an especially 
violent criminal history involving weapons, this fact would likely help 
the court determine whether the presumption that the defendant’s 
possession of a weapon in prison is not a crime of violence has been 
overcome. 
Examining how many and what kind of weapons the defendant 
possessed would also aid the court in determining whether the 
presumption of non-violence has been overcome.  In possession of a 
weapon in prison cases, many courts describe the weapons possessed, as 
these are important facts that could show whether the defendant was 
particularly violent.230  The court in Robles-Rodriguez described the 
weapon possessed as “a six-inch metal shank—a piece of metal with 
tape on one end and sharpened to a point on the other, designed and 
intended to be used as a weapon—concealed in Robles’s left sleeve.”231  
The Tenth Circuit in Perez-Jiminez also described the weapons 
possessed: “two shanks-homemade, sharpened metal knives-each of 
which was approximately five-and-a-half inches long and sharpened to a 
point” were found in the defendant’s pockets.232  While what type of 
weapon the defendant possessed may not by itself show how violent the 
defendant is, this fact can be helpful in residual clause analysis.  When 
the weapon is specially designed to be deadly, as in Robles-Rodriguez 
and Perez-Jiminez, this fact would weigh in favor of the possession 
being violent compared to a defendant who perhaps possessed a 
227.  Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 146 (2008). 
228.  Zuniga, 553 F.3d at 1337. 
229.  Id. 
230.  United States v. Perez-Jiminez, 654 F.3d 1136, 1138 (10th Cir. 2011); Robles-Rodriguez, 
204 Fed. Appx. at 505. 
231.  United States v. Robles-Rodriguez, 204 Fed. Appx. 504, 505 (5th Cir. 2006). 
232.  Perez-Jiminez, 654 F.3d at 1138. 
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haphazardly made “weapon.”  Furthermore, if a prisoner possessed more 
than one weapon, as in Perez-Jiminez, this fact likely weighs in favor of 
showing that the possession was violent, as it is unlikely that a prisoner 
would need more than one weapon for self-defense purposes. 
Examining the past behavior of a defendant in prison is obviously 
useful in determining whether the presumption is overcome.  A 
defendant with previous violent infractions in prison, especially previous 
charges of fighting in prison, is significantly more likely to be a violent 
person in possession of a weapon, as opposed to a model prisoner who 
has never been in fights nor committed any infractions while in prison.  
However, sentencing courts should limit this factual inquiry to official 
prison records showing any infractions (such as the prisoner being in 
isolation as punishment for fighting, etc.) as opposed to holding an ad 
hoc mini-trial.  Lastly, while this may fact may not be as useful as the 
others, inquiring into the particular prison environment the prisoner was 
in may shed light on whether his possession was a crime of violence.  
Studies show that “incarceration exposes male inmates to a world of 
violence where staff cannot or will not protect them from rape, assault, 
and other forms of victimization,” which turns inmates into “non-men” 
in the view of fellow prisoners.233  If a model prisoner possesses a shank 
in a particularly violent prison, this fact may help a court decide that the 
presumption is not overcome.  To establish the environment of the 
prison, the court can turn to studies showing statistics such as the 
number of violent incidents that take place at the prison per year and the 
type of prisoners that the prison holds. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The majority’s holding in United States v. Mobley is just one 
example of the confused and unjust opinions that have followed Begay. 
Because it is difficult to categorically examine whether a crime typically 
involves purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct, many courts have 
 233.  James E. Robertson, “Fight or F. . .” and Constitutional Liberty: An Inmate’s Right to 
Self-Defense When Targeted by Aggressors, 29 IND. L. REV. 339, 339 (1995) (internal quotations 
omitted).  The U.S. Department of Justice reported that state inmates killed forty of their own and 
committed 7,397 assaults upon one another in 1993.  Id. at 341.  The prison environment breeds 
violence because the inmate culture equates manliness and status with displays of toughness and 
aggression.  Id. at 343.  Conflict resolution in prison is violence.  Id.  Most targeted inmates will 
refuse protective custody because it results in around-the-clock segregation and they gain a status as 
a “non-man.”  Id. at 345.  Therefore, many inmates will instead choose to arm themselves with 
“shanks” in order to protect themselves.  Id.  It is well known among inmates that to “make it” in 
prison, you must embrace intimidation and violence as part of everyday life.  Id. 
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distorted the Begay test.234  The Fourth Circuit in Mobley, along with the 
Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, merged the first prong of the Begay 
test with the second prong; these circuits analyzed whether the risk of 
possession of a weapon in prison involves purposeful, violent, and 
aggressive conduct, and not whether the conduct of the crime itself 
involves purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.235  While the risk 
of possessing a weapon in prison is certainly purposeful, violent, and 
aggressive, as the risk is that the prisoner will injure another inmate or 
guard, this goes to the essence of the first prong—that the crime creates 
a serious potential risk of physical injury.  The second prong of Begay is 
not met, as the conduct of the crime of possession of a weapon in 
prison—which is simply possession—is not in itself violent or 
aggressive.236 
Despite its problems, the Begay two-part test remains the 
controlling test for residual clause analysis.  However, to create 
uniformity and remedy the confusing current law on whether possession 
of a weapon in prison is a crime of violence, the Begay test should be 
modified.  Applying a presumption that possession of a weapon in 
prison is not a crime of violence would adhere to the correct application 
of the Begay test and also allow the court to examine an established list 
of facts, avoiding unfairness, if the prosecution wishes to overcome this 
presumption.  By limiting its inquiry to the listed four facts, and 
requiring the prosecution to establish that at least three of the four facts 
show that the prisoner is violent, the sentencing court would avoid both 
a burdensome fact-finding process and also an arbitrary decision.  By 
examining the criminal history of the defendant, the type of and number 
of weapons possessed, the official past behavior of the defendant in 
prison, and the environment of the prison, courts would not have to 
distort or ignore the Begay test to find that a particular defendant’s 
possession of a weapon in prison is a crime of violence.  Therefore, the 
unfairness of the categorical Begay test would be remedied, and circuit 
courts could uniformly follow the same approach in their analysis. 
 234.  See generally supra Part IV.A.1; United States v. Mobley, 687 F.3d 625, 626 (4th Cir. 
2012); Perez-Jiminez, 654 F.3d at 1140; United States v. Boyce, 633 F.3d 708, 709 (8th Cir. 2011); 
United States v. Marquez, 626 F.3d 214, 223 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 235.  See Mobley, 687 F.3d at 626; Perez-Jiminez, 654 F.3d at 1140; Boyce, 633 F.3d at 709; 
Marquez, 626 F.3d at 223. 
236.  See generally supra Part IV.A.2; see United States v. Polk, 577 F.3d 515, 517 (3d Cir. 
2009). 
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APPENDIX: UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES SENTENCING 
TABLE 
U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Part A (18 U.S.C.A. Appx.) 
SENTENCING TABLE 
(in months of imprisonment) 
Criminal History Category (Criminal History Points) 
ZONE A 
Offense     I    II   III   IV      V       VI 
Level (0 or 1) (2 or 3) (4, 5, 6) (7, 8, 9) (10, 11, 12) (13 or more) 
1 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 
2 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 
3 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 
4 0-6 0-6 0-6 
5 0-6 0-6
6 0-6 
7 0-6 
8 0-6 
ZONE B 
Offense I II III IV V VI 
Level (0 or 1) (2 or 3) (4, 5, 6) (7, 8, 9) (10, 11, 12) (13 or more) 
2 1-7 
3 2-8 3-9 
4 2-8 4-10 6-12 
5 1-7 4-10 6-12 9-15 
6 1-7 2-8 6-12 9-15 
7 2-8 4-10 8-14 
8 4-10 6-12 
9 4-10 6-12 8-14 
10 6-12 8-14 
11 8-14 
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ZONE C 
Offense I II III IV V VI 
Level (0 or 1) (2 or 3) (4, 5, 6) (7, 8, 9) (10, 11, 12) (13 or more) 
6 12-18 
7 12-18 
8 10-16 
9 12-18 
10 10-16 
11 10-16 12-18 
12 10-16 12-18 
13 12-18 
ZONE D 
Offense I II III IV V VI 
Level (0 or 1) (2 or 3) (4, 5, 6) (7, 8, 9) (10, 11, 12) (13 or more) 
7 15-21 
8 15-21 18-24 
9 18-24 21-27 
10 15-21 21-27 24-30 
11 18-24 24-30 27-33 
12 15-21 21-27 27-33 30-37 
13 15-21 18-24 24-30 30-37 33-41 
14 15-21 18-24 21-27 27-33 33-41 37-46 
15 18-24 21-27 24-30 30-37 37-46 41-51 
16 21-27 24-30 27-33 33-41 41-51 46-57 
17 24-30 27-33 30-37 37-46 46-57 51-63 
18 27-33 30-37 33-41 41-51 51-63 57-71 
19 30-37 33-41 37-46 46-57 57-71 63-78 
20 33-41 37-46 41-51 51-63 63-78 70-87 
21 37-46 41-51 46-57 57-71 70-87 77-96 
22 41-51 46-57 51-63 63-78 77-96 84-105 
23 46-57 51-63 57-71 70-87 84-105 92-115 
24 51-63 57-71 63-78 77-96 92-115 100-125 
25 57-71 63-78 70-87 84-105 100-125 110-137 
26 63-78 70-87 78-97 92-115 110-137 120-150 
39
Rutsky: U.S. v. Mobley: Another Failure
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2014
890 AKRON LAW REVIEW [47:851 
27 70-87 78-97 87-108 100-125 120-150 130-162 
28 78-97 87-108 97-121 110-137 130-162 140-175 
29 87-108 97-121 108-135 121-151 140-175 151-188 
30 97-121 108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 
31 108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 
32 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 
33 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 
34 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 
35 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 
36 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 
37 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 
38 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 
39 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 
40 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 
41 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 
42 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 
43 life life life life life life 
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